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1 Introduction 
In this study, we employ machine learning methods for a systematic investigation of effect 
heterogeneity of job search programmes (‘JSPs’ from now on) in Switzerland. Programme eval-
uation studies widely acknowledge the possibility of effect heterogeneity for different groups. 
Stratifying the data in mutually exclusive groups or including interactions in a regression 
framework are two baseline approaches to investigate effect heterogeneity (see, e.g., Athey and 
Imbens, 2017a, for a review). However, these approaches may overlook important 
heterogeneities because they usually do not include a systematic search based on clear, spelled-
out statistical rules. Furthermore, for large-scale investigations of effect heterogeneity, standard 
p-values of classical (single) hypothesis tests are no longer valid because of the multiple-hy-
pothesis testing problem (see, e.g., Lan et al., 2016, List, Shaikh, and Xu, 2016). For example, 
for fifty single hypotheses tests, the probability that at least one test falsely rejects the null 
hypotheses at the 5% significance level could be up to 92%.3F1 This could lead to so-called ex 
post selection and the reporting of spurious heterogeneity that, in fact, resulted from so-called 
false positives. 
The disadvantages of ex post selection of significant effects have been widely 
recognized in the programme-evaluation literature. For example, in randomized experiments 
researchers may be required to define their analysis plan for heterogeneity prior to the 
experiment to avoid only reporting (and searching for) significant effects (e.g., Casey, 
Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012, Olken, 2015). However, these pre-analysis plans are inflexible 
and usually not demanded (by funding bodies or editors of economic journals) in the common 
case of observational studies. An alternative approach that partly alleviates the ex post selection 
problem is to report effect heterogeneity for all possible groups. For large-scale investigations, 
an approach that takes account of all possible differences might lead to very small groups and 
                                                                
1 Assuming independent test statistics as an extreme case (1 − 0.9550 = 0.92).  
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thus imprecise estimates. Further, the large number of different results makes it difficult to 
report the results in an intuitive way.  
A developing part of the literature proposes to use machine learning algorithms (adapted 
for causal analysis) to systematically search for groups with heterogeneous effects (see, e.g., 
the review of Athey and Imbens, 2017b). Machine learning approaches are potentially attractive 
because they could provide a principled approach to heterogeneity detection, which make it less 
likely to leave out important heterogeneities and can reduce concerns about the multiple testing 
problem. In addition, they enable flexible modelling and remain computationally feasible, even 
when the covariate space becomes high-dimensional and possibly exceeds the sample size.  
This is one of the first large-scale economic application of causal machine learning 
methods investigating effect heterogeneity for observational studies. In contrast to the few 
existing studies, which mainly exploit randomised control trials (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2017, 
Denisova-Schmidt et al., 2017), we pursue the more common but also more demanding 
selection-on-observables strategy (see, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, for standard 
econometric approaches and their properties). For this reason, we exemplify the application of 
causal machine learning methods at the example of a well-studied training programme for 
which the evaluation literature tackled the selection issues plausibly (see e.g., e.g. Card, Kluve, 
and Weber, 2015, for an overview and meta analysis of evaluation studies of active labour 
market programmes). This enables us to focus on the econometric innovations of the causal 
machine learning approach. 
In particular, we contribute to the causal machine learning literature in at least two ways. 
First, we systematically investigate effect heterogeneity of JSPs and report them in an 
interpretable way. We base the search algorithm for heterogeneity on many attributes of the 
unemployed persons as well as their caseworkers. For example, we consider the employment 
and welfare history of unemployed persons, socio-demographic characteristics, caseworkers’ 
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subjective employability ratings of their clients, and measures for the cooperativeness of 
caseworkers. The latter could uncover effect heterogeneity by different monitoring intensities, 
which we consider an important mechanism of JSPs (Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner, 2010a). 
Overall, we consider 1,268 different variables, including interactions and polynomials. Second, 
based on the detected heterogeneities, we document the potential of different assignment rules 
to improve JSPs’ effects and cost-benefit efficiency.  
Importantly, we investigate the consistency of our findings across a large variety of 
different machine learning algorithms. The causal machine learning literature is still lacking 
large-scale sensitivity checks with regard to methodological choices in credible applications; 
particularly in observational studies. Obviously, the robustness of the results to possible 
misspecifications of the empirical model is essential for drawing coherent policy conclusions.  
For the investigation of effect heterogeneity, we combine Inverse Probability Weighting 
(IPW) with the so-called Modified Covariate Method (MCM) (Tian et al., 2014, Chen et al., 
2017). We use exceptionally rich linked unemployed-caseworker data obtained from Swiss 
social security records. The selection of relevant heterogeneity is carried out with Tibshirani’s 
(1996) Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO). For the quantification of 
the effects and their inference, we follow the sample splitting approach (see recent discussion 
in Rinaldo et al., 2016). We use half of the sample to select variables that are relevant to predict 
the size of the heterogeneous treatment effect, i.e. that are responsible for deviations from the 
average effects. We use the other half of the sample for inference on the (possibly low-
dimensional) selected variables and the heterogeneous effects.  
Our results suggest substantial effect heterogeneity of Swiss JSPs during the first six 
months after the start of participation. During this so-called ‘lock-in’ period, we observe nega-
tive effects for most participants. However, the size of the heterogeneity is strongly related to 
the characteristics of the unemployed. Consistent with the previous literature, participants with 
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disadvantaged labour market characteristics benefit more from JSPs (e.g., Card, Kluve, and 
Weber, 2015). A major reason is that they face generally lower lock-in effects and, thus, these 
indirect programme costs are lower. Additionally, this study appears to be the first to uncover 
substantial effect heterogeneity by residence status. We show that JSPs are more effective for 
foreigners, who have less access to informal job search networks compared to locals. For 
caseworker characteristics, however, there is only little heterogeneity. There is also no substan-
tial effect heterogeneity beyond six months after the start of training. Finally, the paper presents 
easy-to-implement assignment rules which would improve the current assignment mechanism 
in a (almost) cost-neutral way. An extensive sensitivity analysis shows that the main conclu-
sions remain robust across a variety of different estimation methods. 
In the next section, we provide information about the institutional background of the 
Swiss ALMP. In Section 3, we document the sample selection and show basic descriptive 
statistics. In Section 4, we discuss the econometric approach for a principled investigation of 
effect heterogeneity. In Section 5, we report the empirical findings and robustness checks. 
Section 6 explains our conclusions. Additional descriptive statistics, detailed information on 
the selection procedures, results for additional outcome variables, as well as extensive 
sensitivity analyses are reported in Online Appendices A-F. 
2 Background 
2.1 Swiss institutions 
Switzerland is a federal country with 26 cantons and three major language regions (French, 
German, and Italian). It is a relatively wealthy country with approximately 78,000 CHF 
(approx. 77,000 US-Dollar) GDP per capita and a low unemployment rate of 3 to 4% (SECO, 
2017, Federal Statistical Office, 2017). Unemployed persons have to register at the regional 
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employment agency closest to their home.4F2 The employment agency pays income maintenance. 
Benefits amount to 70 to 80% of the former salary depending on age, children, and past salary 
(see Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner, 2010b). The maximum benefit entitlement period is 24 
months. 
The yearly expenditures for Swiss ALMPs exceed 500 million CHF (Morlok et al., 2014). 
Unemployed persons can participate in a variety of different ALMPs. Gerfin and Lechner 
(2002) classify these ALMPs as (a) training courses, (b) employment programmes, and (c) 
temporary employment schemes. Training courses include job search, personality, language, 
computer, and vocational programmes. We focus on JSPs in this study, which is the most 
common ALMP in Switzerland (more than 50% of the assigned ALMPs are JSPs, see Huber, 
Lechner, and Mellace, 2017). JSPs provide training in effective job search and application 
strategies (e.g., training in résumé writing). Furthermore, actual applications are screened and 
monitored. JSPs are relatively short, with an average duration of about three weeks. Training 
takes place in classrooms. The employment agency covers the costs of training and travel. 
Participants are obliged to continue to search for jobs during the course.  
In Switzerland, regional employment agencies have a large degree of autonomy, which 
is partly related to the country’s federal organisation. Caseworkers make the decision to assign 
unemployed persons to a training course based on information about the unemployed person 
(e.g. employment history, subjective employability rating, etc.). Additionally, employment 
agency policies and federal eligibility rules are relevant for the assignment decision. The federal 
eligibility rules are rather vague. They imply, for example, that the training has to be necessary 
and adequate to improve the individual’s employment chances. Caseworkers can essentially 
force the unemployed into such courses by threatening to impose sanctions. Unemployed 
                                                                
2  At the beginning of the unemployment spell, newly registered unemployed persons are often sent to a one-day workshop 
providing information about the unemployment law, obligations and rights, job search requirements, etc. 
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persons have the option to apply to participate in such courses, but the final decision is always 
made by the caseworkers. 
2.2 Related literature on job search programmes (JSPs) 
An assignment to a JSP may affect the matching process and quality alignment between the 
participant and his or her potential new job (see, e.g., Blasco and Rosholm, 2011, Cottier et al., 
2017). Push effects could occur if participants accept jobs with low matching quality because 
of actual or perceived sanctions or perceived future ALMP assignments. Push effects decrease 
the duration of unemployment, but may reduce employment stability. On the other hand, JSP 
participation could improve the visibility of suitable job vacancies and the efficiency of the 
application process, which may improve employment stability. Furthermore, many studies are 
concerned with the crowding-out of non-participants (see, e.g., Blundell et al., 2004, Crépon et 
al., 2013, Gautier et al., 2017).  
Empirical evidence about the effectiveness of JSPs is mixed. The review studies of 
Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010, 2015) as well as Crépon and van den Berg (2016) document a 
weak tendency towards positive effects of JSPs, especially in the short-term.5F3 However, for 
Swiss JSPs, the literature finds negative employment effects, which taper off one year after the 
start of participation (see Gerfin and Lechner, 2002, Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller, 2008). 
One reason for the ambiguous effectiveness of JSPs might be the different relative intensities 
of job search training and monitoring. Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) are concerned 
that intensive monitoring reduces informal job search, which might be a more efficient strategy 
than formal job search for some unemployed persons. They suggest formal job search is more 
                                                                
3  Meyer (1995) reports negative effects on unemployment benefit payments and positive earnings effects of JSPs in the US. 
Graversen and van Ours (2008) and Rosholm (2008) report positive effects of JSPs on the unemployment exit rate in 
Denmark. Wunsch and Lechner (2008) find that JSPs have negative effects during the first two years after a programme 
begins, which fade out afterwards in Germany. They also show that training sequences are responsible for long-lasting 
negative lock-in effects. 
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effective for individuals with fewer labour market opportunities. Consistent with their 
arguments, Card, Kluve, and Weber (2015) document that JSPs are relatively more effective 
for disadvantaged participants. Vikström, Rosholm, and Svarer (2013) find slightly more 
positive effects of JSPs for women and younger participants. Dolton and O’Neill (2002) report 
negative employment effects of JSPs for men and insignificant effects for women five years 
after the programme begins. Surprisingly, the programme evaluation literature is lacking large-
scale evidence about the effect heterogeneity of JSPs. 
3 Data 
3.1 General 
The data we use includes all individuals who are registered as unemployed at a Swiss regional 
employment agency in the year 2003. The data contains rich information from different un-
employment insurance databases (AVAM/ASAL) and social security records (AHV). This is 
the standard data used for many Swiss ALMP evaluations (e.g. Gerfin and Lechner, 2002, 
Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller, 2008, Lechner and Smith, 2007). We observe (among others) 
residence status, qualification, education, language skills, employment history, profession, job 
position, industry of last job, and desired occupation and industry. The administrative data is 
linked with regional labour market characteristics, such as the population size of municipalities 
and the cantonal unemployment rate. The availability of extensive caseworker information and 
their subjective assessment of the employability of their clients is what distinguish our data. 
Swiss caseworkers employed in the period of 2003 to 2004 were surveyed through a written 
questionnaire in December 2004 (see Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner, 2010a, 2010b). The 
questionnaire asked about the caseworker’s aims and strategies and information about the 
regional employment agency.  
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3.2 Sample definition 
In total, 238,902 persons registered as being unemployed in 2003. We only consider the first 
unemployment registration per individual in 2003. Each registered unemployed person is as-
signed to a caseworker. In most cases, the same caseworker is responsible for the entire 
unemployment duration of his or her client. If this is not the case, we focus on the first 
caseworker to avoid concerns about (rare) endogenous caseworker changes (see Behncke, 
Frölich, and Lechner, 2010b). We only consider unemployed persons aged between 24 and 55 
years who receive unemployment insurance benefits. We omitted unemployed persons who 
apply for disability insurance benefits, persons whose responsible caseworker is not clearly 
defined, or persons whose caseworker did not answer the questionnaire (the response rate is 
84%). We omitted unemployed foreigners with a residence permit that is valid for less than a 
year. Finally, we omitted unemployed persons from five regional employment agencies that are 
not comparable to the other regional employment agencies. This sample is identical to the data 
used in Huber, Lechner, and Mellace (2017). It contains 100,120 unemployed persons.  
One concern regarding the treatment definition is the timing with respect to the elapsed 
unemployment duration prior to participation. Caseworkers may assign unemployed persons to 
job training programmes at essentially anytime during their unemployment spell. Such dynamic 
or sequential programme assignment has received considerable attention in the evaluation lit-
erature (see the discussions in Abbring and van den Berg, 2003, 2004, Fredriksson and 
Johansson, 2008, Heckman and Navarro, 2007, Lechner, 2009, Robins, 1986, Sianesi, 2004, 
among others). We consider a classical static evaluation model and define treatment as the first 
participation in a JSP during the first six months of unemployment (83% of JSP are assigned 
within the first six months of unemployment). We exclude individuals who participate in other 
ALMPs within the first six months of unemployment from the sample, such that our control 
group represents non-participants of all programmes (8,787 other ALMP participants are 
dropped). Potentially, this approach could lead to a higher share of individuals with better 
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labour market characteristics among the control group than among the training participants, 
because individuals in the control group may have possibly found another job prior to their 
potential treatment times. This would negatively bias the results. To overcome this concern, we 
assign conditional random (pseudo) participation starts to each individual in the control group. 
Thereby, we recover the distribution of the elapsed unemployment duration at the time of 
training participation from the treatment group (similar to, e.g., Lechner, 1999, Lechner and 
Smith, 2007). To ensure comparability of the treatment definitions of the participants and non-
participants, we only consider individuals who are unemployed at their (pseudo) treatment 
dates. This makes the groups of participants and non-participants comparable with respect to 
the duration of unemployment and ensures that the treated and control groups are eligible for 
programme participation at their respective assigned start dates. 
The final sample contains 85,198 unemployed persons (Table A.1 in Online Appendix A 
provides the details of the sample selections steps). From this sample, 12,998 unemployed 
persons participate in a JSP and 72,200 are members of the control group. These 85,198 
unemployed persons are assigned to 1,282 different caseworkers. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations by JSP participation for some selected 
variables. During the first 6 months after training begins, JSP participants are fewer months 
employed than non-participants. The standardised difference is above 20.6F4 During the first 12 
and 31 months after training begins, JSP participants also have a shorter employment duration 
                                                                
4 The standardised difference of variable 𝑋𝑋 between samples 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 is defined as 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = |𝑋𝑋�𝐴𝐴 − 𝑋𝑋�𝐵𝐵|
�1 2⁄ �𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴) + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵)� ∙ 100, 
where 𝑋𝑋�𝐴𝐴 denotes the mean of sample 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑋𝑋�𝐵𝐵 denotes the mean of sample 𝐵𝐵. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) consider a 
standardised difference of more than 20 as being ‘large’. 
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than non-participants, but the standardised differences decline. During months 25 to 31 after 
training begins, the difference in the employment duration is minor. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of some important variables by JSP participation status. 
  Participants Non-Participants Std. Diff. 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome: Months employed since programme start 
During first 6 months 1.21 1.93 1.94 2.44 23.29 
During first 12 months 3.68 4.27 4.53 4.80 13.12 
During first 31 months 15.30 12.49 15.59 12.85 1.60 
During months 25 - 31 3.48 2.88 3.33 2.86 3.72 
Characteristics of unemployed persons 
Female 0.45 - 0.44 - 0.58 
Age (in 10 years) 3.73 0.88 3.66 0.86 5.59 
Unskilled 0.22 - 0.23 - 1.80 
Some qualification degree 0.60 - 0.56 - 5.19 
Employability rating low 0.12 - 0.14 - 3.97 
Employability rating medium 0.77 - 0.74 - 5.79 
Employability rating high 0.11 - 0.12 - 3.62 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years 0.41 0.98 0.64 1.27 13.85 
Fraction of months emp. in last 2 years 0.83 0.22 0.79 0.25 12.57 
Past income (in 10,000 CHF) 4.58 2.02 4.16 2.05 14.50 
Caseworker characteristics 
Female 0.45 - 0.41 - 6.94 
Age (in years) 44.0 11.6 44.4 1.16 7.7 
Tenure (in years) 5.54 3.23 5.86 3.31 6.84 
Own unemp. experience 0.63 - 0.63 - 0.54 
Vocational training degree 0.26 - 0.23 - 5.63 
Local labour market characteristics 
German speaking REA 0.89 - 0.67 - 39.68 
French speaking REA 0.08 - 0.25 - 33.30 
Italian speaking REA 0.03 - 0.08 - 16.81 
Cantonal unemployment rate (in %) 3.64 0.77 3.75 0.86 9.23 
Cantonal GDP per capita (in 10,000 CHF) 5.13 0.92 4.92 0.93 15.75 
# of caseworkers 989 1,282   
# of observations 12,998 72,200  
Note:  We report unconditional means for all variables, standard deviations (S.D.) for all non-binary variables, and 
standardised differences between participants and non-participants. The descriptive statistics of all confounding 
variables used in this study are shown in Table B.1 of Online Appendix B. REA is the abbreviation for regional 
employment agency. 
Furthermore, Table 1 documents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the 
unemployed person, the characteristics of his or her caseworker, and local labour market 
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conditions. We report descriptive statistics for additional control variables in Table B.1 of 
Online Appendix B. JSP participants have spent more months employed and received a higher 
income than non-participants in the last two years prior to the programme’s start. We document 
minimal difference between the caseworkers of participants and non-participants.7F5 JSP 
participants are more often registered at German-speaking regional employment agencies and 
live in cantons with better economic conditions (in terms of local GDP and unemployment rate) 
than non-participants. 
4 Econometric approach 
4.1 Parameters of interest 
We describe the parameters of interest using Rubin’s (1974) potential outcome framework. 
Following the conventional notation, we indicate random variables by capital letters and the 
realizations of these random variables by lowercase letters. The binary treatment dummy 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
indicates JSP participation. Let 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 denote the potential outcome (e.g., employment) when 
individual 𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁) participates in a JSP (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1). Conversely, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0 denotes the potential 
outcome when individual 𝑖𝑖 is not participating in a JSP (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 0). Obviously, each individual 
can either participate in a JSP or not, but both participation states cannot occur simultaneously. 
This implies only one potential outcome is observable. The observed outcome equals 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖). 
The causal effect of 𝑆𝑆 on 𝑌𝑌 for individual 𝑖𝑖 is 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0. 
                                                                
5  In Table B.1 of Online Appendix B we also show caseworker characteristics interacted with the language of the regional 
employment agency. For some interacted variables, we find strong differences between participants and non-participants. 
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However, we cannot identify the parameter 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 without assumptions that are implausible in many 
applications (e.g., effect homogeneity). Nevertheless, group averages of 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 may be identifiable 
under plausible assumptions. For example, the identification of the average treatment effect 
(ATE), 𝛾𝛾 = 𝐸𝐸[𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖], the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), 𝜃𝜃 = 𝐸𝐸[𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1], and 
the average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATENT), 𝜌𝜌 = 𝐸𝐸[𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 0], are standard 
econometric problems (see, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, conditional 
average treatment effects (CATEs) can potentially uncover effect heterogeneity based on 
exogenous pre-treatment variables 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 chosen by the researcher based on the policy interest,  
𝛾𝛾(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸[𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧]. 
Knowledge about CATEs could help, e.g., to improve the assignment mechanism to JSPs.8F6 
4.2 Econometric background and intuition 
Machine learning methods are powerful tools for out-of-sample predictions of observable var-
iables. However, the fundamental problem of causal analyses is the inability to observe 
individual causal effects because at least one potential outcome is unobservable. Recently, 
several methods have been proposed that apply machine learning methods in ways that 
overcome this fundamental problem (see, e.g., the reviews by Belloni, Chernozhukov, and 
Hansen, 2014, Horowitz, 2015, and Varian, 2014).  
Concerning effect heterogeneity, Imai and Ratkovic (2013) suggest a LASSO-type 
algorithm while Athey and Imbens (2016) propose a regression tree method. Foster, Taylor, 
and Ruberg (2011) apply random forest algorithms to estimate effect heterogeneity. These 
algorithms are flexible and are effective at capturing multi-dimensional and non-linear 
                                                                
6  Additional parameters are CATEs for JSP participants 𝜃𝜃(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸[𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧] and CATEs for non-participants 𝜌𝜌(𝑧𝑧) =
𝐸𝐸[𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧]. The parameters 𝛾𝛾(𝑧𝑧), 𝜃𝜃(𝑧𝑧), and 𝜌𝜌(𝑧𝑧) can differ from each other when 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 differs from 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 (which is 
the case in our application). However, we are interested in the heterogeneities for a random unemployed person with specific 
characteristics because this mirrors the decision problem of the caseworker. Thus, we focus on 𝛾𝛾(𝑧𝑧).   
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interactions among covariates. Imai and Strauss (2011), Green and Kern (2012), and Taddy et 
al. (2015) propose alternative Bayesian machine learning methods to estimate effect heteroge-
neity. Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood (2017) do not attempt to use the best method 
available. Instead, they suggest combining many different machine-learning tools to estimate 
the conditional treatment responses. Athey and Wager (2017), Qian and Murphy (2011), Xu et 
al. (2015), and Zhao et al. (2012) focus on the estimation of individualized treatment rules, 
which primarily focus on decision rules instead of effect heterogeneity.9F7  
All of these studies consider heterogeneity in randomized experiments. In many fields 
of economics, randomized experiments are expensive and minimally socially acceptable. 
Therefore, we consider a selection-on-observables identification strategy (e.g. Imbens, 
Wooldridge, 2009). A promising approach to estimate group specific causal effects in non-
experimental contexts is the Modified Covariate Method (MCM).10F8  
To gain some intuition about the MCM, we consider the stylised case where 
participation in a programme is randomly assigned to 50% of the unemployed persons. 
Accordingly, in this introductory example there is no need to adjust for selection into training 
participation. Throughout the analyses the first element in 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is a constant term (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖0 = 1) and 
the remaining elements of 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 contain additional 𝑝𝑝 ≥ 1 pre-treatment variables that are 
potentially related to the effect heterogeneity in which the researcher is interested. A standard 
approach to estimate effect heterogeneity is to use the interaction model,  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 .                                                       (1) 
                                                                
7  Closely related is the study of Ciarleglio et al. (2015), who propose a method to select the optimal treatment conditional on 
observed individual characteristics. Zhao et al. (2015) investigate the optimal dynamic order of sequential treatments. 
8  Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2012) develop alternative non-experimental approaches for a principled effect heterogeneity 
search, which is an adaptation of the Modified Outcome Method (MOM) (Signorovitch, 2007). We describe the MOM in 
Online Appendix F.1. For one of the robustness checks, we replicate our results using the MOM. Furthermore, the tree and 
forest methods of Athey and Imbens (2016) and Wager and Athey (2017) are applicable in non-experimental settings. All 
robustness checks are provided in Section 5.7 and Online Appendix F. The main findings are not altered. 
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The first term on the right side of equation (1) provides a linear approximation of the conditional 
expectation of the potential outcome under non-participation, 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧] = 𝑧𝑧𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠. We call this 
the main effects in the following. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) pro-
vides a linear approximation of the CATE: 
𝛾𝛾(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑧𝑧𝛿𝛿 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧]. 
Vansteelandt et al. (2008) point at possible sensitivities of the empirical model in equation (1) 
when the main effects are mis-specified. Tian et al. (2014) propose to transform the treatment 
dummy 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 1 and rearrange the interaction model in equation (1) to: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖2 𝛿𝛿 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 .                                                      (2) 
The treatment indicator shifts from 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1} to 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 2⁄ ∈ {−0.5,0.5}. The modification does not 
alter the coefficient vector 𝛿𝛿. However, this transformation alters the main effects. In equation 
(2), 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧] = 𝑧𝑧𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 is the linear approximation of the conditional expectation of the ob-
served outcome. Notice that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝐸𝐸[𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖] = 0 for 𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, … ,𝑝𝑝}. 
The first equality holds under random assignment of training participation and the second 
equality holds because 𝐸𝐸[𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖] = 0.11F9 Accordingly, the right hand terms of equation (2) are 
independent of each other and we can estimate the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 and 𝛿𝛿 in two separate 
regressions. For example, we can estimate CATEs with the model 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖2 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
which is the baseline model of the MCM. The MCM is suitable when only the interaction effects 
and not the main effects are of interest. Parsimony and robustness to misspecification of the 
main effects are two advantages of the MCM compared to the specification in equation (1). We 
can adopt the basic idea of the MCM to non-experimental identification strategies (see Chen et 
                                                                
9   In contrast, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝐸𝐸[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖] = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)/2, which can be different from zero. 
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al., 2017). Furthermore, we can combine the MCM with different machine learning methods to 
select the variables for heterogeneity. Procedure 1 summarises our (main) estimation algorithm 
of the adapted MCM approach, which we describe in detail below. 
4.3 Identification 
In addition to the pre-treatment variables included in the vector 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 (which are potentially related 
to effect heterogeneity), we consider the possibility of confounding variables, which are in-
cluded in the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖. Confounders are pre-treatment variables that jointly affect the prob-
ability to participate in a JSP and the employment outcome. The vector 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 may be larger, 
smaller, partially, or fully overlapping with 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 depending on the question under investigation.  
Assumption 1 (Conditional independence): 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0∐D𝑖𝑖|X𝑖𝑖 = x, Z𝑖𝑖 = z for all values of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑧𝑧 
in the support of 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑍𝑍. 
Assumption 2 (Common support): 0 < 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) < 1 for all 
values of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑧𝑧 in the support (of interest) of 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑍𝑍. 
Assumption 3 (Exogeneity of controls): 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖0 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖0. 
Assumption 4 (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, SUTVA): 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0(1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖). 
Assumption 1 states that the potential outcomes are independent of programme 
participation conditional on the confounding pre-treatment variables. The plausibility of this 
assumption is justified by the availability of a detailed set of confounding variables containing 
characteristics of the unemployed and the caseworkers. The studies of Biewen et al. (2014) and 
Lechner and Wunsch (2013) discuss the selection of confounders in ALMP evaluations based 
on rich administrative data. Within the employment agency, caseworkers have high autonomy 
to decide about assignment of JSPs. Our data contain the same objective measures about labour 
market history, education and socio-demographics of the unemployed, as well as local labour 
market characteristics that are observable to the caseworkers when choosing who participates 
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in JSPs. We observe caseworkers’ subjective ratings of the employability of their clients. 
Furthermore, we observe detailed information about the caseworkers’ characteristics and 
counselling styles. These are potential confounders, because caseworker characteristics might 
affect the probability of JSP participation and labour market outcomes simultaneously.  
According to Assumption 2, the conditional probability to participate in a JSP is 
bounded away from zero and one. The common support assumption has to hold when 
conditioning jointly on 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑍𝑍. We enforce common support by trimming observations below 
the 0.5 quantile of participants and above the 99.5 quantile of non-participants.12F10 This procedure 
shows good finite sample performance in the study of Lechner and Strittmatter (2017). 
Assumption 3 requires exogeneity of confounding and heterogeneity variables. To account for 
this assumption, we only use control variables that are determined prior to the start of JSP 
participation. Assumption 4 excludes spillover effects between participants and non-
participants. 
Theorem 1 (Identification): Under Assumptions 1-4 (and regularity conditions ensuring the 
existence of appropriate moments) the following equality holds: 
𝛾𝛾(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍=𝑧𝑧[𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖| 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧)|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧]
− 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍=𝑧𝑧[𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖| 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧)|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧]. 
Thus ( )zγ  are identified from observable data on {𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁 . For completeness, the proof 
of Theorem 1 is in Online Appendix C (see also, e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  
4.4 Search for effect heterogeneity 
Chen et al. (2017) outline how we can combine MCM with Inverse Probability Weighting 
(IPW), a standard approach to balance covariates in observational studies (see, e.g., Hirano, 
                                                                
10  In total, we trim 6,767 observations (579 participants, 6,188 non-participants). 
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Imbens, and Ridder, 2003, Horvitz and Thompson, 1952). We can estimate the parameter vector 
𝛿𝛿 using Weighted Ordinary Least Squares (WOLS), i.e. by minimising the objective function 
argmin
𝛿𝛿�
� 𝑤𝑤�(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖2 𝛿𝛿�2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
� ,                                     (3) 
with the IPW weights 
𝑤𝑤�(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)?̂?𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1 − ?̂?𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖))
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∑
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
?̂?𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 + (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)∑ 1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖1 − ?̂?𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , 
which we calculate using the estimated propensity score ?̂?𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖). In our baseline model, we 
adapt the propensity score specification of Huber, Lechner, and Mellace (2017), which we re-
port in Table D.1 of Online Appendix D. The denominator of the IPW weights is a small sample 
adjustment to ensure that the weights for treated and controls sum to one (see, e.g., Busso, 
DiNardo, and McCrary, 2014). In equation (3), we multiply the IPW weights by 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, such that 
the weights are positive. 
The variables included in 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖, which are potentially related to effect heterogeneity, con-
sist of individual and caseworker characteristics, their second order interactions, up to fourth 
order polynomials, and logarithms of non-binary variables. Additionally, we consider dummy 
variables for the 103 employment agencies as well as 29 category dummies for previous 
industry and 29 category dummies describing the previous job. In total, this leads to 1,268 
heterogeneity variables that we consider in the analyses.13F11 
In our main specifications, we employ LASSO estimators. The weighted LASSO 
estimator of the MCM minimizes the objective function, 
                                                                
11  We exclude binary variables where less than 1% of (non-) participants show values of 0 or 1. Furthermore, we keep only 
one variable of variable combinations that show correlations of larger magnitude than ±0.99 to speed up computation. 
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argmin
𝛿𝛿�
� 𝑤𝑤�(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖2 𝛿𝛿�2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
�  +  𝜆𝜆��𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖�,                        (4)𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1
 
where we add a penalty term for the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients of the 𝑝𝑝 
variables appearing in 𝑍𝑍. Importantly, we do not penalize the constant 𝛿𝛿0. The penalising 
parameter 𝜆𝜆 specifies the amount of penalisation. If 𝜆𝜆 = 0, then equation (4) is equivalent to 
the WOLS model in equation (3). However, when 𝜆𝜆 > 0 some coefficients are shrunken 
towards zero. For sufficiently large values of 𝜆𝜆, some (or all) coefficients are exactly zero. 
Therefore, the LASSO serves as a model selector, omitting variables with little predictive power 
from the model.14F12 A challenge is the optimization of the penalty term, such that only the relevant 
predictors of the effect heterogeneity remain in the model. Too low penalties lead to overfitting, 
too high penalties lead to models that miss important variables (i.e., we have a bias-variance 
trade-off).  
We apply 10-fold cross-validation to find the penalty term 𝜆𝜆 with the best out-of-sample 
performance in terms of mean-squared-error (MSE) (e.g., Bühlmann and van de Geer, 2011).15F13 
The LASSO coefficients are biased when 𝜆𝜆 > 0 (regularisation bias, see, e.g., Zou, 2006). For 
this reason, we use the so-called Post-LASSO estimates to calculate the MSE. We obtain the 
Post-LASSO coefficients from a WOLS model, which includes all variables with non-zero 
coefficients in the respective LASSO model (see, e.g. Belloni and Chernozhukov 2013). We 
choose the LASSO model with the penalty parameter 𝜆𝜆 that minimises the Post-LASSO MSE.16F14  
There is no need to specify the main effects in the MCM approach. Nevertheless, Tian et 
al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2017) show that accounting for the main effects can improve the 
                                                                
12  The larger the values of 𝜆𝜆 the fewer variables remain in the model. By gradually increasing the penalty term one can obtain 
a path from a full model to a model that only contains the parameter ?̂?𝛿0. 
13  Chetverikov, Liao, and Chernozhukov (2017) discuss the properties of K-fold cross-validation in the context of LASSO. 
They derive bounds for the prediction errors of cross-validated LASSO estimators. 
14  In robustness checks, we base the selection of the penalty parameter on the LASSO MSE. The main results are not altered. 
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finite sample performance of the MCM because they can absorb variation in the outcome, which 
is unrelated to the effect heterogeneity. In Online Appendix F.2, we document two ways to 
implement an efficiency augmenting procedure. 
Note that in case Z contains variables not included among the confounders 𝑋𝑋, there is 
some concern that including Z in the estimation of the propensity score might inflate the 
propensity score without removing additional selection bias. Therefore, our main specification 
is based on 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) only. We also estimate specifications allowing 𝑍𝑍 to enter the propensity score 
as well, 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) (see Appendix F.5). However, besides decreasing the precision of the estimates, 
the main results are not altered. 
4.5 Estimation of CATEs 
To avoid the situation in which the LASSO approach models idiosyncratic within-sample 
effects, we randomly partition the sample into two equal sized parts. We assume independence 
between the two samples. We use the first sample to select the relevant effect heterogeneity 
variables (training sample). We use the second sample for the estimation of a WOLS model 
including all selected heterogeneity variables (estimation sample). This is called the ‘honest’ 
inference procedure (see the discussion about the general properties, e.g., in Fithian, Sun, and 
Taylor, 2017).  
The CATE for individual 𝑖𝑖 is estimated as 𝛾𝛾�(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿. All coefficients of variables not 
selected in the training sample are set to zero. The coefficients of the selected variables are 
estimated in the estimation sample and extrapolated to the full sample. The medical and 
biometric literature calls 𝛾𝛾�(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) individualised treatment effects (ITE) (e.g., Chen et al., 2017). 
The estimates of 𝛿𝛿 vary with respect to the random sample split. To reduce the dependency of 
the results on a particular split, we run the analyses 𝑆𝑆 = 30 times with different random splits. 
We calculate the individualised CATEs, 𝛾𝛾�𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠, for each split, where the Post-LASSO 
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coefficients, 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠, are from the random sample split 𝑠𝑠. We use these parameters to calculate the 
aggregated CATEs, ?̅?𝛾(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 1𝑆𝑆 ∑ 𝛾𝛾�𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1 . This procedure is in the spirit of bootstrap 
aggregation (`bagging`) in the machine learning literature (see, e.g., Breiman, 1996). It reduces 
model dependency and smooths the estimated CATEs, but the estimation model of ?̅?𝛾(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) is 
more difficult to interpret than the model of 𝛾𝛾�(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖). To understand which factors influence the 
aggregated CATEs, we report averages by different groups,  
?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔 = 1∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ?̅?𝛾(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖), 
where the binary variable 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 indicates whether individual 𝑖𝑖 belongs to the group (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 1) or not 
(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 0). These groups could, for example, be all JSP participants, all non-participants, or 
unemployed persons with specific characteristics. 
4.6 Variance estimation 
It appears natural to estimate the variance with a bootstrap approach over the whole estimation 
algorithm, including the variable selection step. However, this is computationally infeasible for 
a reasonable number of bootstrap replications. Thus, we use a computationally feasible 
bootstrap approach in which we fix the selected heterogeneity variables in each sample split.  
First, we draw a random bootstrap sample 𝑏𝑏 (with replacement) clustered on the 
caseworker level. Second, for each sample split, we align the observations in the bootstrap 
sample to the observations in the original estimation sample. We only keep observations that 
we observe in both the bootstrap and the estimation sample. Third, based on these samples, we 
re-estimate the CATEs for each sample split using the heterogeneity variables selected in the 
original training sample of the respective sample split. We repeat these three steps 1,000 times. 
This procedure takes into account the dependencies that stem from overlapping observations 
across sample splits. 
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Procedure 1: Estimation algorithm of the adapted MCM.  
Step 1 Estimate propensity score ?̂?𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) and calculate the IPW weights. 
Step 2 a) Randomly split the sample into training and estimation sample 𝑠𝑠.  
b) Select the relevant heterogeneity variables in the training sample using the LASSO 
approach with or without efficiency augmentation (explained in Appendix F.2). 
c) Estimate the coefficients  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠: 
(i) Set the coefficients of deselected variables to zero. 
(ii) Estimate the coefficients of the selected variables in the estimation sample. 
d) Calculate 𝛾𝛾�𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 for the full sample. 
Step 3  a) Repeat Step 2 S times. 
b) Calculate the aggregated CATEs ?̅?𝛾(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 1𝑆𝑆 ∑ 𝛾𝛾�𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1  and group averages of 
CATEs ?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔 = 1∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ?̅?𝛾(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖). 
Step 4 Bootstrap the variance of ?̅?𝛾(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) and ?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔. (For computational feasibility, we do not re-
estimate Step 2b) in the bootstrap replications.) 
 
For each sample split 𝑠𝑠 and bootstrap replication 𝑏𝑏 we obtain the bootstrapped CATEs, 
𝛾𝛾�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠. The aggregated bootstrapped CATEs are ?̅?𝛾𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 1𝑆𝑆 ∑ 𝛾𝛾�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1 . We esti-
mate the standard error for the aggregated CATEs with 
𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖 = �1𝐵𝐵��?̅?𝛾𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) − 1𝐵𝐵�?̅?𝛾𝑠𝑠(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)𝐵𝐵
𝑠𝑠=1
�
2𝐵𝐵
𝑠𝑠=1
, 
and the standard errors of CATEs by groups with 
𝜎𝜎�𝑔𝑔 = �1𝐵𝐵��?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠 − 1𝐵𝐵�?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵
𝑠𝑠=1
�
2𝐵𝐵
𝑠𝑠=1
, 
where ?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠 is the estimate of ?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔 in the respective bootstrap replication 𝑏𝑏. 
5 Results 
5.1 Propensity score model 
Table D.1 in Appendix D reports the average marginal effects of the estimated propensity score 
model.  The propensity score estimates serve as inputs into the matching algorithm. The results 
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confirm the impression from the descriptive statistics in Table 1, namely that the participation 
probability is generally increasing with previous labour market success. Unemployed persons 
with good labour market opportunities have a greater probability to participate in a JSP. Such 
a selection of training participants is called ‘cream-skimming’ (e.g., Bell and Orr, 2002). The 
effect of training is not necessarily higher for participants with good labour market 
opportunities, because these participants would have good labour market opportunities even in 
the absence of training (see, e.g., the discussion in Berger, Black, and Smith, 2000).  
When performing matching, it is a best practice to check for potential issues of (i) 
insufficient support in the propensity scores across treatment states that may result in 
incomparable matches as well as large matching weights of some non-treated observations with 
specific propensity scores; and (ii) imbalances in covariates after matching (due to inappropriate 
propensity score specifications). We document the distribution of the baseline propensity score 
in Figure D.1 of Online Appendix D. Furthermore, we document the balancing of the control 
variables after matching in Table D.2 of Online Appendix D. We find only small imbalances 
between JSP participants and non-participants. The standardised differences are always below 
three. 
5.2 Average effects 
Figure 1 shows the estimated potential outcomes and average programme effects on 
employment for each of the first 31 months after the programme’s start. We observe substantial 
negative lock-in effects. The employment probability in the first three months is about 15 
percentage points lower for JSP participants compared to non-participants. However, 
differences in the two groups’ employment probabilities disappear after 16 months. In months 
22 to 24 after a programme’s start, we find small positive effects. But this seems to be only of 
short duration. Overall, the long-term effects are insignificant and close to zero. The negative 
lock-in effects are consistent with the findings of the previous Swiss JSP evaluations (e.g., 
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Gerfin and Lechner, 2002, Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller, 2008). Moreover, the 
effectiveness of JSPs is also negative in other countries (see e.g., Dolton and O’Neil, 2002, 
Wunsch and Lechner, 2008). It is possible that participants reduce the intensity of informal job 
search during participation in a JSP, which could explain negative employment effects. 
Searching for effect heterogeneity in each month after a programme’s start is 
computationally expensive and hard to intuitively summarise (at least if it varies over time). 
Therefore, we estimate the effects of JSP participation on cumulated months employed during 
the first 6, 12, and 31 months after a programme begins, as well as during months 25 to 31. 
Table 2 shows the respective average effects that mirror the findings in Figure 1. The lower 
employment probabilities after programme participation translate into an average decline of 0.8 
employment months (≈ -24 days) during the first six months after the start of participation. This 
decreases to -1.1 months (≈ -33 days) during the first 12 and 31 months. We find no significant 
employment effects during months 25 to 31 after the start of participation. 
Figure 1: ATE, ATET, and potential outcome levels by months since the start of JSP 
participation. 
 
Note:  We estimate the ATE and ATET separately for each of the first 31 months after the start of JSP participation. 
Circles/triangles indicate significant effects at the 5% level. We obtain standard errors from a clustered bootstrap at 
thecaseworker level with 4,999 replications.    
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Table 2: ATE, ATET, and ATENT by duration since the start of JSP participation. 
Months employed since start of ATE ATET ATENT 
participation Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
During first 6 months -0.80*** (0.02) -0.82*** (0.02) -0.80*** (0.02) 
During first 12 months -1.10*** (0.05) -1.13*** (0.04) -1.09*** (0.05) 
During first 31 months -1.14*** (0.14) -1.20*** (0.13) -1.12*** (0.15) 
During months 25-31 -0.007 (0.03) -0.011 (0.03) -0.007 (0.04) 
Note:  We obtain standard errors (S.E.) from a clustered bootstrap at the caseworker level with 4,999 replications. *, **, *** 
mean statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
5.3 Effect heterogeneity 
Table 3 reports the estimated heterogeneity coefficients, 𝛿𝛿, obtained from one of the considered 
random partitions into training and estimation samples.17F15 The coefficients are the marginal ef-
fects of the respective variables on the treatment effect of JSP (as opposed to the marginal 
effects of the respective variables on the outcome level in standard linear regression models).  
The first column of Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients for the outcome cumulated 
employment during the first six months after training participation begins. In this specification, 
the Post-LASSO estimation selects 17 out of 1,268 potential variables. In the estimation sample, 
five of these variables are significant; for example, the treatment effect increments by 0.3 
months (≈ 9 days) for unskilled workers with previous earnings below 25,000 CHF a year (see 
row 3). When all other selected variables equal zero, the predicted effect of JSP participation 
for unskilled workers with previous earnings below 25,000 CHF a year would be -0.89 + 0.3 =
−0.59 months employment (≈ -17 days). However, we must be cautious when interpreting the 
coefficients, because they are selected to maximise prediction power and might differ from the 
structural (causal) model (see, e.g., discussion in Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017).  
                                                                
15  We omit the coefficients of the main effects because they are only used for efficiency augmentation and irrelevant for the 
interpretation. 
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Table 3: Post-LASSO coefficients for selected outcome variables. 
 
Months employed during 
first 6 months after the 
start of participation 
Months employed during 
first 12 months after the 
start of participation 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -0.89*** (0.05) -1.29*** (0.09) 
# of unemp. spells in last two years 0.06 (0.12) - - 
Unskilled × past income 0 - 25k 0.30*** (0.11) 0.53 (0.53) 
Skilled w/o degree × same gender like CW 0.20 (0.21) - - 
Skilled w/o degree × age difference between unemployed & CW -0.01 (0.01) - - 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years × age of CW 0.00 (0.00) - - 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years × medium city size -0.05 (0.06) -0.13 (0.14) 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years × past income 0 - 25k -0.04 (0.06) -0.10 (0.14) 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years × prev. job unskilled 0.04 (0.05) 0.21* (0.13) 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years × same gender like CW -0.01 (0.05) - - 
CW has own unemp. experience × prev. job unskilled 0.19** (0.09) 0.34* (0.21) 
Foreigner with perm. residence permit × past income 25 - 50k 0.19 (0.12) - - 
Small city × past income 50 - 75k -0.16* (0.09) -0.26 (0.20) 
Single household × no emp. spell last 2 years -0.17** (0.08) - - 
Single household × prev. job unskilled 0.16 (0.11) - - 
Prev. job primary sector × age difference between unemp. 
person & CW 
-0.02** (0.01) - - 
Prev. job restaurant -0.01 (0.12) - - 
Prev. job tourist sector -0.09 (0.12) - - 
Unskilled × prev. job unskilled - - -0.22 (0.64) 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years × unempl. & CW have primary 
education 
- - 0.19** (0.08) 
CW has vocational training degree × past income 50 - 75k - - -0.13 (0.30) 
Past income 25 - 50k × unskilled - - 0.14 (0.24) 
# of emp. spells past 5 years × prev. job in primary sector - - -0.24 (2.16) 
Prev. job in primary sector × unskilled - - -0.19 (0.53) 
Regional emp. agency No. 44 - - -0.68 (0.52) 
# of selected variables 17 of 1,268 13 of 1,268 
Note:  We apply one-step efficiency augmentation. We partition the data randomly into selection and estimation samples. 
We choose the penalty term based on Post-LASSO RMSE, which we optimise with 10-fold cross-validation. We 
obtain standard errors (S.E.) from a clustered bootstrap at the caseworker level with 4,999 replications. *, **, *** 
mean statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. We report results for additional 
outcomes in Table E.1 of Online Appendix E. CW is the abbreviation for caseworker. 25 - 50k is the abbreviation 
for 25,000-50,000 CHF. 50 – 75k is the abbreviation for 50,000-75,000 CHF. 
The second column of Table 3 shows the coefficients for the thirteen selected 
heterogeneity variables for the outcome cumulated employment during the first twelve months 
after training participation begins. The selected heterogeneity variables are partially 
overlapping between the two outcomes (comp. column 1 and 2). In Table E.1 in Online 
Appendix E, we report the selected heterogeneity parameters for the outcome cumulated 
26  
months employed in the first 31 months after training participation begins. We omit the results 
for the outcome cumulated months employed between months 25 to 31 after training 
participation begins, because we do not detect any effect heterogeneity in the considered sample 
split.  
To improve precision and check the sensitivity of our results, we investigate the Post-
LASSO models for different random sample splits. For each random partition, we obtain 
different Post-LASSO models (Table F.6 in Online Appendix F documents the number of 
selected variables in the different random sample splits). This is unsurprising, because many of 
the variables we consider are highly correlated (e.g., different measures of the employment 
history). Therefore, the same CATE can be obtained from different Post-LASSO models, each 
considering different variables or different functions of variables. Table F.1 in Online Appendix 
F documents the average correlation between CATEs for different sample splits. The 
correlations are positive and relatively large. Accordingly, the CATEs are consistent across the 
sample splits we consider. The selected models are not identical, but each model essentially 
predicts similar CATEs.  
One approach to get an overview of the heterogeneities we detect is to plot the 
distribution of the predicted effects. Therefore, Figure 2 reports the distribution of the 
aggregated CATEs of JSPs on cumulated months employed during the first six months after 
participation begins. The figure documents substantial variation in the aggregated CATEs. For 
most groups of unemployed persons the aggregated CATE of JSP participation is between -0.8 
and -1 months of employment (approximately a decline of between 24 and 30 days). However, 
the CATEs are less negative or even positive for a non-negligible fraction of the unemployed 
persons. This points at potential ways to improve assignment to a JSP. 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of aggregated CATEs for months employed during first six months after 
the start of participation. 
 
Note:  Kernel smoothed distribution of CATEs. Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 0.02, chosen by Silverman’s rule-of-
thumb. We apply one-step efficiency augmentation. We partition the data randomly into selection and estimation 
samples. We choose the penalty term based on Post-LASSO RMSE, which we optimise with 10-fold cross-
validation. The dashed vertical line shows the ATE. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the aggregated CATEs. For all outcomes, the means 
of the aggregated CATEs are close to the (semi-parametrically) estimated ATEs (comp. Table 
2). This confirms that the estimation of the aggregated CATEs works well, on average. For all 
outcomes, the median is slightly lower than the mean. This suggests a right-skewed distribution 
(similar to Figure 2). We find substantial heterogeneity for the outcomes cumulated months 
employed during the first 12 months and the first 31 months after the start of JSP participation. 
After 12 months, the JSP effect ranges from minus two to plus two employment months. After 
31 months, the JSP effect ranges from minus three to plus three employment months. However, 
for the outcome cumulated months employed between month 25 and 31 after the start of JSP 
participation we find little heterogeneity.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of aggregated CATEs. 
Months employed since start  of 
participation   Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Mean 
S.E. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
During first 6 months  -0.78 -0.84 0.25 -1.41 0.77 0.07 
During first 12 months -1.10 -1.20 0.32 -2.09 1.44 0.10 
During first 31 months -1.13 -1.25 0.60 -3.79 4.12 0.23 
During months 25-31  -0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.32 0.48 0.04 
Note:  We obtain CATEs from aggregating CATEs from 30 different random sample splits. Standard deviations are 
abbreviated with S.D. in column (3). Column (6) shows mean standard errors of CATEs. 
Accordingly, the MCM successfully discovers substantial effect heterogeneity. 
However, interpretation of the results is not straightforward, because the underlying functions 
are too complex. Figure 2 and Table 4 document two ways to aggregate the results. However, 
we want to go beyond these abstract descriptions and make explicit policy recommendations. 
In the next section, we marginalise the effects for specific variables of interest. This enables us 
to reveal more of the CATEs’ structure. Afterwards, we focus on the implementation of specific 
JSP assignment rules. 
5.4 Effect heterogeneity by selected variables 
In this section, we average CATEs by characteristics of unemployed persons and their case-
workers. For each characteristic, we partition the sample into two mutually exclusive groups 
(high 𝑔𝑔 = 1 and low 𝑔𝑔 = 0 group), by using a binary characteristic itself or by discretising at 
the median of non-binary characteristics. The parameters ?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔=1 and ?̅?𝛾𝑔𝑔=0 average the CATEs 
over all unemployed in the respective group.  
Figure 3 reports effect heterogeneity of JSP participation on cumulated months 
employed during the first six months after the start of participation by low and high values of 
the characteristics of unemployed persons. The groups in the top of Figure 3 show the largest 
effect heterogeneities. For groups at the bottom of Figure 3 we find only little effect 
heterogeneity. We estimate the largest degree of effect heterogeneity for unskilled workers. The 
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average effect of JSP for the unskilled unemployed is 0.26 months (≈ 8 days) longer than for 
unemployed persons in other skill categories (see Table E.2 in Online Appendix E).  
Figure 3: CATEs on cumulated employment during the first 6 months after start JSP 
participation by characteristics of unemployed persons. 
 
Note:  CATEs by low and high values of the respective characteristic of unemployed persons. A low value is zero when 
the variable is binary or below the median when the variable is non-binary. A high value is one when the variable is 
binary or not below the median when the variable is non-binary. The CATEs are based on 30 random sample 
splits. For each partition, we choose the penalty term based on Post-LASSO RMSE, which we optimise with 10-fold 
cross-validation. We apply one-step efficiency augmentation. We report the 95%-confidence interval based on the 
bootstrap procedure described in section 4.6. *, **, *** mean statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% 
level, respectively. The differences and respective standard errors are reported in Table E.2 in Online Appendix E. 
We report results for additional outcomes in Figures E.1, E.3, and E.5 in Online Appendix E. 
Conversely, Figure 3 documents that individuals with some degree of education suffer 
on average more from JSP than individuals with no degree. In general, we observe that the 
negative lock-in effect is much less pronounced for unemployed persons with lesser 
qualifications. This suggests that cream-skimming reduces the effectiveness of JSP 
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participation. These findings are consistent with the evaluation literature (e.g., Card, Kluve, and 
Weber, 2015, van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006). Furthermore, the lock-in effects are 
less negative for foreigners. One potential explanation is that foreigners have a relatively small 
network for an informal job search. Therefore, the formal job search strategy might be relatively 
successful for them. This suggests more foreigners should be assigned to JSPs. We find only a 
little heterogeneity by gender and age, which is in line with the findings of Vikström, Rosholm, 
and Svarer (2013) for JSPs in Denmark. In our application, the effect heterogeneity by gender 
is not statistically significant (see standard errors in Table E.2 in Online Appendix E). 
Figure 4 reports effect heterogeneity of JSP participation on cumulated months employed 
during the first six months after the start of participation by low and high values of caseworker 
characteristics. The interpretation of Figure 4 corresponds to the interpretation of Figure 3. Alt-
hough we find some statistically significant differences, they are much less pronounced than 
for the characteristics of unemployed persons. Most effect heterogeneity is observed by 
caseworkers’ own unemployment experience, but the difference is only 0.07 months (≈ 2 days). 
However, the difference is statistically significant (see Table E.3 in Online Appendix E). 
Interestingly, the cooperativeness of caseworkers has no statistically significant influence on 
the effectiveness of JSP participation. We would have expected this characteristic to be a good 
predictor for effect heterogeneity, because it might approximate different monitoring intensities 
of the caseworker. 
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Figure 4: CATEs on cumulated employment during the first 6 months after start JSP 
participation by caseworker characteristics. 
 
Note:  CATEs by low and high values of the respective caseworker characteristic. A low value is zero when the variable is 
binary or below the median when the variable is non-binary. A high value is one when the variable is binary or not 
below the median when the variable is non-binary. The CATEs are based on 30 random sample splits. For each 
partition, we choose the penalty term based on Post-LASSO RMSE, which we optimise with 10-fold cross-
validation.. We apply one-step efficiency augmentation. We report the 95%-confidence interval based on the 
bootstrap procedure described in section 4.6. *, **, *** mean statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% 
level, respectively. The differences and respective standard errors are reported in Table E.3 in Online Appendix E. 
We report results for additional outcomes in Figures E.2, E.4, and E.6 in Online Appendix E. CW is the abbreviation 
for caseworker. 
5.5 Assignment rules for JSP  
Next, we investigate the characteristics of unemployed persons with positive CATEs (Table 5). 
The number of individuals with positive CATEs amounts to 674, which corresponds to 0.9% 
of the unemployed persons in the sample. The first row of Table 5 reports the share of 
unemployed persons assigned to a JSP by the sign of the CATEs. Only 7% of unemployed 
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persons with positive CATEs participate in a JSP, whereas 16% of the unemployed persons 
with negative CATEs participate in a JSP. This points to the potential to improve the selection 
of JSP participants. Figure 5 provides further evidence in this direction. It documents the 
relationship between the CATEs and the propensity score. An effective selection of JSPs would 
show a positive relationship, indicating that those who benefit more have a higher JSP 
participation probability. However, Figure 5 shows over a wide range (i.e., for unemployed 
persons with more than 10% participation probability) a negative relationship between the 
CATEs and the propensity score. This implies, those unemployed persons who suffer more 
from JSPs have a higher participation probability. 
Figure 5: Correlation of the propensity score and the CATEs. 
 
Note: Kernel smoothed regression of propensity score and CATEs. Local constant kernel regression used with Gaussian 
kernel and bandwidth 0.02 computed by the plug-in bandwidth selector Fan and Gijbles (1996). The dashed 
horizontal line shows the ATE. The grey bars show the histogram of the propensity score. 
Additionally, Table 5 reports characteristics of unemployed persons with positive and 
negative CATEs. The difference gives explicit advice on how assignment rules to JSPs could 
be improved. For example, unemployed persons with a lower past income and lesser past 
employment experience tend to have positive effects from participation. Participants with lower 
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degrees of education and foreigners seem to have a higher probability to profit from a JSP. 
Strikingly, those unemployed persons who receive a low employability rating by their 
caseworker are more likely to experience positive effects from a JSP than unemployed persons 
with a medium or high rating. These results are further evidence that cream-skimming does not 
improve JSP effectiveness. 
Furthermore, we document the effectiveness of hypothetical statistical assignment rules 
in Table 6. Statistical assignment rules have already received considerable attention in the 
context of ALMPs (see, e.g., Bell and Orr, 2002, Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen, 2008, Frölich, 
2008, Dehejia, 2005, O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner, 2002, among many others). However, we 
are not aware of any application using machine learning methods to investigate assignment 
rules for ALMP that systematically consider a high-dimensional covariate space.  
For the proposed assignment rules, we keep the number of 12,712 (hypothetical) JSP 
participants constant.18F16 Therefore, the proposed assignment rules are (almost) cost-neutral com-
pared to the existing assignment mechanism. However, we do not account for possible capacity 
limits in regional training centres. We consider five hypothetical assignment rules: (i) random 
allocation (called ‘random’ in the following), (ii) assignment of unemployed persons with the 
highest CATEs (called ‘best case’ in the following), (iii) assignment of unemployed persons 
with the lowest CATEs (called ‘worst case’ in the following), (iv) all unemployed persons with 
at least one unemployment spell in the previous two years and unskilled plus a random selection 
of the remaining unemployed persons with at least one unemployment spell in the previous two 
years and no degree (called ‘previous unemployment’ in the following), and (v) all unemployed 
with a low employability rating by their caseworkers plus a random sample with a medium 
employability rating (called ‘employability rating’ in the following). The random adding of 
                                                                
16  We consider only participants on the common support. Therefore, the number of participants considered here is lower than 
previous numbers. 
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participants in assignment rules (iv) and (v) enables us to maintain the number of 12,712 
participants. The ‘previous unemployment’ rule (iv) is inspired by the variables that show the 
highest treatment effects in Table 3 and Figure 3. The ‘employability rating’ rule (v) assigns 
unemployed persons to a JSP for whom the caseworkers give a low employability rating, as 
opposed to cream-skimming, which assigns more unemployed persons with high employability 
ratings. 
Table 6 reports the average CATE under the different assignment rules. The average 
CATE represents the hypothetical ATET under this treatment assignment. The ‘worst case’ and 
‘best case’ assignment rules are the lower and upper bounds of the ATET (for a fixed number 
of 12,712 participants). The difference between the lower and upper bounds are about 0.65 
employment months (≈ 20 days). The ATET under random assignment is -0.78 months (≈ -24 
days) employment during the first six months after the start of participation. This is the 
benchmark assignment rule. Any imposed assignment rule should be better than random 
assignment. However, the observed ATET is -0.82 months (≈ -25 days) employment during 
the first six months after the start of the programme. It appears that the current assignment 
mechanism is not better than a random assignment rule. In the context of Swiss ALMPs, 
Lechner and Smith (2007) also find that the allocation by caseworkers performs no better than 
random assignment. Furthermore, this is consistent with the findings of Bell and Orr (2002) and 
Frölich (2008), who reject the idea that caseworkers allocate training programs efficiently in 
the US and Sweden. Applying the optimal assignment rule ‘best case’ would reduce the 
negative employment effects by 60% (= �(0.82 − 0.33)/0.82� ∙ 100%). 
For the proposed assignment rule ‘previous employment’ the predicted ATET is -0.51 
months (≈ -15 days) employment during the first six months after the start of participation. On 
average, each participant has 9 days more employment under this assignment rule than under 
random assignment. The negative employment effect of the current assignment mechanism 
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would be reduced by 38% (= �(0.82 − 0.51)/0.82� ∙ 100%). For the proposed assignment 
rule ‘employability rating’ the predicted ATET is -0.61 months (≈ -18 days) employment dur-
ing the first six months after the start of participation. On average, each participant has 6 days 
more employment under this assignment rule than under random assignment. The negative em-
ployment effect of the current assignment mechanism would be reduced by 21% (=
�(0.82 − 0.61)/0.82� ∙ 100%). These results are consistent with the argument that 
assignments based on expected treatment effects rather than on predicted outcomes can be more 
successful (Ascarza, 2016). However, the average effects remain negative and the programme 
does not seem useful in improving the employment opportunities of unemployed persons in 
general. Nevertheless, the easy-to-implement assignment rules document the potential to 
improve the current allocation mechanism. 
Table 5: Characteristics of unemployed by the sign of CATE. 
 0iγ ≥  0iγ <  Difference S.E. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
JSP participation 0.07 0.16 -0.09*** (0.01) 
Female 0.41 0.45 -0.04 (0.07) 
Past income (in 10,000 CHF) 0.32 0.42 -0.11*** (0.02) 
Fraction of months emp. in last 2 years 0.70 0.80 -0.10*** (0.01) 
# of unemp. spells in last 2 years 4.71 0.54 4.17*** (0.50) 
Unskilled 0.62 0.24 0.38*** (0.09) 
Semiskilled 0.16 0.16 0.00 (0.05) 
Skilled without degree 0.14 0.04 0.10* (0.06) 
Some educational degree 0.08 0.57 -0.49*** (0.03) 
Foreigner with mother tongue is cantons’ language 0.14 0.11 0.03 (0.02) 
Low employability rating by CW 0.43 0.14 0.29*** (0.11) 
Medium employability rating by CW 0.56 0.76 -0.20* (0.11) 
High employability rating by CW 0.01 0.10 -0.10*** (0.003) 
Age (in 10 years) 3.57 3.67 -0.10 (0.08) 
Foreigner with temporary residence permit 0.32 0.13 0.19*** (0.06) 
Foreigner with permanent residence permit 0.41 0.25 0.16** (0.07) 
# of individuals 674 77,824   
Note:  Average characteristics of individuals with positive and negative CATE in the first 6 months after start of 
participation. The CATEs are based on 30 random sample splits. For each partition, we choose the penalty term 
based on Post-LASSO RMSE, which we optimise with 10-fold cross-validation. We apply one-step efficiency 
augmentation. We report the 95%-confidence interval based on the bootstrap procedure described in section 4.6. *, 
**, *** mean statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. CW is the abbreviation for 
caseworker. 
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Table 6: Average CATE of hypothetical participants under different assignment rules. 
 Assignment rule CATE for participants 
 (1) 
Observed (ATET) -0.82 
(i) Random -0.78 
(ii) Best case -0.33 
(iii) Worst case -1.07 
(iv) Previous unemployment -0.51 
(v) Employability rating -0.61 
# of participants 12,712 
Note:  Based on CATEs of 30 replications with one step efficiency augmented 10-fold cross-validated Post-LASSO. 
5.6 Sensitivity checks 
We perform large-scale sensitivity analyses to investigate the robustness of our results with 
respect to the choice of the empirical method and the selection of tuning parameters. We repli-
cate our estimates using different forms of efficiency augmentation (see Online Appendix F.2). 
As an alternative variable selector, we consider the adaptive LASSO (Zou, 2006, see Online 
Appendix F.3). Furthermore, we replicate the results with the Modified Outcome Method 
(MOM) (Signorovitch, 2007, Zhang et al., 2012, see Online Appendix F.1) instead of the MCM. 
Moreover, we employ radius-matching with bias adjustment (Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 
2011) to balance the observable covariates between the treatment and control group instead of 
the IPW weights. This method shows good finite sample performance (Huber, Lechner, and 
Wunsch, 2013). Furthermore, we compare the robustness of the main results with two different 
sets of additional confounders (see Online Appendix F.5 for a description how we select the 
additional confounders). Finally, we compare our results with the causal forest approach 
(Wager and Athey, 2017, see Online Appendix F.4). 
Table 7 reports the correlation between the CATEs for different empirical procedures. No 
matter which specification we use, the correlation between the CATEs is always positive and 
mostly above 0.5. The causal forest CATEs are less strongly correlated, but they still show a 
decently strong positive association. Accordingly, our main findings are not overly sensitive to 
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the choice of empirical methods or selection of tuning parameters. We report additional sensi-
tivity checks in Online Appendix F.6. The estimation results are widely consistent across a 
variety of different methodological choices and estimation procedures. 
Table 7: Correlation between CATEs obtained from different empirical procedures. 
Cumulated employment during first 6 months (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) MCM, one-step EA, Post-LASSO 1.00 
     
(2) MCM, two-step EA, Post-LASSO 0.87 1.00 
    
(3) MCM, no EA, Post-LASSO 0.77 0.77 1.00 
   
(4) MCM, one-step EA, adaptive LASSO 0.78 0.55 0.62 1.00 
  
(5) MCM, two-step EA, adaptive LASSO 0.77 0.56 0.58 0.87 1.00 
 
(6) MCM, no EA, adaptive LASSO 0.67 0.56 0.83 0.67 0.62 1.00 
(7) MOM, Post-LASSO 0.75 0.77 0.81 0.58 0.56 0.64 
(8) MOM, adaptive LASSO 0.62 0.49 0.66 0.67 0.72 0.71 
(9) MCM, one-step EA, Post-LASSO with radius-matching weights 0.97 0.87 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.66 
(10) MCM, one-step EA, LASSO 0.85 0.61 0.65 0.93 0.79 0.62 
(11) Procedure (1) + additional confounders 1 0.83 0.75 0.65 0.59 0.62 0.54 
(12) Procedure (11) + additional confounders 2 0.90 0.86 0.72 0.62 0.65 0.59 
(13) Causal forest 0.55 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.50 
Cumulated employment during first 6 months (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(8) MOM, adaptive LASSO 0.55 1.00     
(9) MCM, one-step EA, Post-LASSO with radius-matching weights 0.74 0.61 1.00    
(10) MCM, one-step EA, LASSO 0.62 0.58 0.81 1.00   
(11) Procedure (1) + additional confounders 1 0.69 0.51 0.82 0.67 1.00  
(12) Procedure (11) + additional confounders 2 0.77 0.55 0.91 0.70 0.92 1.00 
(13) Causal forest 0.43 0.40 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.52 
Note:  Correlations of CATEs for different methods of efficiency augmentation, variable selection, modifications and 
weights. EA is the abbreviation for efficiency augmentation. If not specified differently, IPW weights are used to 
balance the covariates. In procedure (9), we use radius-matching weights (Lechner Miquel, and Wunsch, 2011). 
See Online Appendix F for more details about the different procedures. In Online Appendix F.5, we describe how 
we select additional confounders for procedures (11) and (12). Tables F.2-F.4 in Online Appendix F contain the 
correlation between CATEs for the other outcomes. 
6 Conclusion 
We investigate recently developed machine learning methods to uncover systematically 
treatment effect heterogeneity. We apply these methods to estimate the heterogeneous effects 
of Swiss Job Search Programmes (JSPs) on different employment outcomes by allowing for a 
high-dimensional set of variables potentially related to effect heterogeneity. We develop easy-
to-implement, efficiency-improving assignment rules for JSPs. 
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The employment effects of JSPs are negative during the first six months after the start of 
participation and taper off afterwards. Parallel to this finding, we discover substantial effect 
heterogeneity during the first six months after the start of participation, but not afterwards. 
While an appropriate assignment rule could substantially decrease the negative lock-in effects, 
the negative effects are unlikely to disappear completely. In particular, we find that unemployed 
persons with low employment opportunities as well as foreigners experience less negative 
effects. The data used contains the caseworkers’ subjective employability rating of their clients. 
Using this measure alone for programme assignment, i.e. if caseworkers assign mainly 
unemployed persons with a low employability rating, then negative lock-in effects are already 
reduced by approximately 22%. The results remain consistent across a range of alternative 
estimators and different implementation choices, showing the robustness of the findings. 
There are still many open questions that are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. On 
the substantive side, for example, it is not clear that the largely negative results will generalize 
to other economic environments and other versions of JSPs implemented in other times and 
other countries. On the methodological side, it must be acknowledged that despite the extensive 
robustness checks, these methods are still very new and there could be practical problems not 
yet uncovered. We investigate the heterogeneous employment effects of a particular programme 
for different unemployed persons. The study abstracts from the questions about an optimal 
programme for a particular unemployed person, which is also relevant because of the usually 
rich programme structure of ALMPs. Such a modified goal raises several additional statistical 
issues that may be addressed in future research. 
References 
Abbring, J.H., G.J. van den Berg (2003): “The Non-Parametric Identification of Treatment 
Effects in Duration Models”, Econometrica, 71, 1491-1517. 
39  
Abbring, J.H., G.J. van den Berg (2004): “Analyzing the Effect of Dynamically Assigned 
Treatments using Duration Models, Binary Treatment Models, and Panel Data Models”, 
Empirical Economics, 29, 5-20. 
Ascarza, E. (2016): “Retention Futility: Targeting High Risk Customers might be Ineffective”, 
Colombia Business School Research Paper, 16-28. 
Athey, S., G.W. Imbens (2016): “Recursive Partitioning for Heterogeneous Causal Effects”, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, 113 (27), 
7353-7360. 
Athey, S., G.W. Imbens (2017a): “The Econometrics of Randomized Experiments”, in 
Handbook of Field Experiments, ed. by A.V. Banerjee, E. Duflo, 1, 73-140, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam.    
Athey, S., G.W. Imbens (2017b): “The State of Applied Econometrics - Causality and Policy 
Evaluation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31 (2), 3-32. 
Athey, S., S. Wager (2017): “Efficient Policy Learning”, Working Paper, arXiv: 1702.02896. 
Behncke, S., M. Frölich, M. Lechner (2010a): “Unemployed and their Caseworkers: Should 
they be Friends or Foes?” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 173 (1), 67-92. 
Behncke, S., M. Frölich, M. Lechner (2010b): “A Caseworker like Me – Does the Similarity 
between the Unemployed and their Caseworkers Increase Job Placements?” Economic 
Journal , 120 (549), 1430-1459. 
Bell, S., L. Orr (2002): “Screening (and Creaming?) Applicants to Job Training Programs: The 
AFDC Homemaker Home Health Aide Demonstration”, Labour Economics, 9 (2), 279-302. 
Belloni, A., V. Chernozhukov (2013): “Least Squares after Model Selection in High-
Dimensional Sparse Models”, Bernoulli, 19 (2), 521–547. 
Belloni, A., V. Chernozhukov, C. Hansen (2014): “High-Dimensional Methods and Inference 
on Structural and Treatment Effects”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28 (2), 29–50. 
Berger, M., D. Black, J. Smith (2000): “Evaluating Profiling as a Means of Allocating 
Government Services," in Econometric Evaluation of Labour Market Policies, ed. by M. 
Lechner, F. Pfeiffer, 59-84. Physica, Heidelberg. 
Bertrand, M., B. Crepon, A. Marguerie, P. Premand (2017): “Contemporaneous and Post-
Program Impacts of a Public Works Program: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire”, Working Paper. 
40  
Biewen, M., B. Fitzenberger, A. Osikominu, and M. Paul (2014): “The Effectiveness of Public 
Sponsored Training Revisited: The Importance of Data and Methodological Choices”, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 32 (4), 837-897. 
Blasco, S, M. Rosholm (2011): “The Impact of Active Labour Market Policy on Post-
Unemployment Outcomes: Evidence from a Social Experiment in Denmark”, IZA 
Discussion Paper, No. 5631. 
Blundell, R., M.C. Dias, C. Meghir, J.V. Reenen (2004): “Evaluating the Employment Impact 
of a Mandatory Job Search Program”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (4), 
569-606. 
Breiman, L. (1996): “Bagging Predictors”, Machine Learning, 24 (2), 123–140. 
Bühlmann, P., S. van de Geer (2011): Statistics for High-Dimensional Data: Methods, Theory 
and Applications, Springer, Heidelberg. 
Busso, M., J. DiNardo, J. McCrary (2014): “New Evidence on the Finite Sample Properties of 
Propensity Score Reweighting and Matching Estimators”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 96 (5), 885–897. 
Caliendo, M., R. Hujer, S. Thomsen (2008): “Identifying Effect Heterogeneity to Improve the 
Efficiency of Job Creation Schemes in Germany”, Applied Economics, 40 (9), 1101-1122. 
Card, D, J. Kluve, A. Weber (2010): “Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta 
Analysis”, Economic Journal, 120 (548), F452-F477. 
Card, D, J. Kluve, A. Weber (2015): “What Works? A Meta Analysis of Recent Active Labor 
Market Program Evaluations”, Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming. 
Casey, K., R. Glennerster, E. Miguel (2012): “Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts 
Using a Pre-analysis Plan”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (4), 1755-1812. 
Chen, S., L. Tian, T. Cai, M. Yu (2017): “A General Statistical Framework for Subgroup 
Identification and Comparative Treatment Scoring”, Biometrics, 73 (4), 1199-1209. 
Chetverikov, D., Z. Liao, V. Chernozhukov (2017): “On Cross-Validated Lasso”, Working 
Paper, arXiv: 1605.02214.    
Ciarleglio, A., E. Petkova, R.T. Ogden, T. Tarpey (2015): “Treatment Decisions Based on 
Scalar and Functional Baseline Covariates”, Biometrics, 71 (4), 884–894. 
Cottier, L., P. Kempeneers, Y. Flückiger, R. Lalive (2017): “Does Intensive Job Search 
Assistance Help Job Seekers Find and Keep Jobs?”, Working Paper. 
41  
Crépon, B., E. Duflo, M. Gurgand, R. Rathelot, P. Zamora (2013): “Do Labor Market Policies 
Have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered Randomized Experiment”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (2), 531-80. 
Crépon B, G. van den Berg (2016): “Active Labor Market Policies“, Annual Review of 
Economics, 8, 521-546. 
Dehejia, R. (2005): “Program Evaluation as a Decision Problem," Journal of Econometrics, 
125 (1-2), 141-173. 
Denisova-Schmidt, E., M. Huber, E. Leontyevac, A. Solovyevab (2017): “Combining 
Experimental Evidence with Machine Learning to Assess Anti-Corruption Educational 
Campaigns among Russian University Students”, Working Paper. 
Dolton, P., D. O’Neill (2002): “The Long-Run Effects of Unemployment Monitoring and 
Work-Search Programs: Experimental Evidence from the United Kingdom”, Journal of 
Labor Economics, 20 (2), 381-403. 
Fan, J., Gijbels, I. (1996): “Local Polynomial Modelling and its Applications: Monographs on 
Statistics and Applied Probability 66”. CRC Press. 
Federal Statistical Office (2016): “Gross Domestic Product per Capita“, www.bfs.admin.ch.  
Fithian, W., D. Sun, J. Taylor (2017): “Optimal Inference After Model Selection”, Working 
Paper, arXiv: 1410.2597.    
Fredriksson, P. and Johannsen, P. (2008): “Dynamic Treatment Assignment - The Conse-
quences for Evaluations using Observational Data”, Journal of Business and Economic and 
Statistics, 26 (4), 435-445. 
Frölich, M. (2008): “Statistical Treatment Choice: An Application to Active Labour Market 
Programmes", Journal of the American Statistical Association, 103 (482), 547-558. 
Foster, J.C., J.M.G. Taylor, S.J. Ruberg (2011): “Subgroup Identification from Randomized 
Clinical Trial Data”, Statistics in Medicine, 30 (24), 2867-2880. 
Gautier P., P. Muller, B. van der Klaauw, M. Rosholm, M. Svarer (2017): “Estimating 
Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance“, Working Paper. 
Gerfin M., M. Lechner (2002): “A Microeconometric Evaluation of Active Labour Market 
Policy in Switzerland“, Economic Journal, 112 (482), 854-893. 
Graversen, B.K., J.C. Van Ours (2008): “How to Help Unemployed find Jobs Quickly: 
Experimental Evidence from a Mandatory Activation Program” Journal of Public 
Economics, 92 (10-11), 2020-2035. 
42  
Green, D.P., H.L. Kern (2012): “Modelling Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Survey 
Experiments with Bayesian Additive Regression Trees”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 76 (3), 
491-511.  
Grimmer, J., S. Messing, S.J. Westwood (2017), “Estimating Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
and the Effects of Heterogeneous Treatments with Ensemble Methods”, Political Analysis, 
25 (4), pp. 413-434.  
Heckman, J. and Navarro, S. (2007): “Dynamic Discrete Choice and Dynamic Treatment 
Effects”, Journal of Econometrics, 136 (2), 341-396. 
Hirano, K., G.W. Imbens, G. Ridder (2003): “Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment 
Effects Using the Estimated Propensity Score”, Econometrica, 71 (4), 1161-1189. 
Hoerl, A. E., and R. W. Kennard (1970): “Ridge Regression: Biased Estimation for 
Nonorthogonal Problems”, Technometrics, 12 (1) 55-67. 
Horowitz, J. L.  (2015): “Variable Selection and Estimation in High-Dimensional Models”, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 48 (2), 389-407. 
Horvitz, D.G., D.J.  Thompson (1952): “A Generalization of Sampling without Replacement 
from a Finite Universe”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 47 (260), 663-685. 
Huber, M., M. Lechner, G. Mellace (2017): “Why Do Tougher Caseworkers Increase 
Employment? The Role of Programme Assignment as a Causal Mechanism”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 99 (1), 180-183. 
Huber, M., M. Lechner, C. Wunsch (2013): “The Performance of Estimators Based on the 
Propensity Score“, Journal of Econometrics, 175 (1), 1-21. 
Imai, K., M. Ratkovic (2013): “Estimating Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Randomized 
Program Evaluation”, Annals of Applied Statistics, 7 (1), 443-470. 
Imai, K., A. Strauss (2011): “Estimation of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects from Randomized 
Experiments, with Applications to the Optimal Planning of the Get-Out-of-the-Vote 
Campaign”, Political Analysis, 19 (1), 1-19. 
Imbens, G.W., J.M. Wooldridge (2009): “Recent Developments in the Econometrics of 
Program Evaluation”, Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (1), 5-86. 
Lalive, R., J.C. van Ours, J. Zweimüller (2008): “The Impact of Active Labor Market Programs 
on the Duration of Unemployment”, Economic Journal, 118 (525), 235-257.  
Lan, W., P. Zhong, R. Li, H. Wang, C. Tsai (2016): “Testing a Single Regression Coefficient 
in High Dimensional Linear Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 195 (1), 154-168. 
43  
Lechner, M. (1999): “Earnings and Employment Effects of Continuous Off-the-job Training in 
East Germany after Unification”, Journal of Business Economics and Statistics, 17 (1), 74-
90. 
Lechner, M. (2009): “Sequential Causal Models for the Evaluation of Labor Market Program”, 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 27 (1), 71–83.  
Lechner, M., R. Miquel, C. Wunsch (2011): “Long-Run Effects of Public Sponsored Training 
in West Germany“, Journal of the European Economic Association, 9 (4), 742-784. 
Lechner, M., J.A. Smith (2007): “What is the Value Added by Caseworkers?” Labour 
Economics, 14 (2), 135-151. 
Lechner M., A. Strittmatter (2017): “Practical Procedures to Deal with Common Support 
Problems in Matching Estimation”, Econometric Reviews, forthcoming. 
Lechner, M., C. Wunsch (2009): “Are Training Programs more Effective when Unemployment 
is High?”, Journal of Labor Economics, 27 (4), 653-692. 
Lechner, M., C. Wunsch (2013): “Sensitivity of Matching-Based Program Evaluations to the 
Availability of Control Variables”, Labour Economics, 21 (C), 111-121. 
List, J., Shaikh, A., Y. Xu (2016): “Multiple Hypothesis Testing in Experimental Economics”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 21875. 
Meyer, B.D. (1995): “Lessons from the US Unemployment Insurance Experiments”, Journal 
of Economic Literature, 33 (1), 91-131. 
Morlok, M., D. Liechti, R. Lalive, A. Osikominu, J. Zweimüller (2014): “Evaluation der ar-
beitsmarktlichen Massnahmen: Wirkung auf Bewerbungsverhalten und –chancen“, SECO 
Publikationen, Arbeitsmarktpolitik No. 41. 
Mullainathan, S., J. Spiess (2017): “Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31 (2), 87–106. 
O’Leary, C., P. Decker, S. Wandner (2002): “Targeting Reemployment Bonuses”, in Targeting 
Employment Services, ed. by R. Eberts, C. O’Leary, S. Wandner, 161-182,  W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo. 
Olken, B. (2015): “Promises and Perils of Pre-Analysis Plans”, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 29 (3), 61-80. 
Qian, M., S.A. Murphy (2011): “Performance Guarantees for Individualized Treatment Rules”, 
Annals of Statistics, 39 (2), 11-80. 
44  
Rinaldo, A., L. Wasserman, M. G'Sell, J. Lei, R. Tibshirani (2016). “Bootstrapping and Sample 
Splitting for High-Dimensional, Assumption-Free Inference”, Working Paper, arXiv: 
1611.05401. 
Robins, J.M. (1986): “A New Approach to Causal Inference in Mortality Studies with Sustained 
Exposure Periods - Application to Control of the Healthy Worker Survivor Effect”, 
Mathematical Modelling, 7 (9-12), 1393–1512. 
Rosenbaum, P.R., D.B. Rubin (1983): “The Central Role of Propensity Score in Observational 
Studies for Causal Effects”, Biometrika, 70 (1), 41-55. 
Rosenbaum, P.R., D.B. Rubin (1985): “Constructing a Control Group using Multivariate 
Matched Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score”, The American 
Statistician, 39 (1), 33–38. 
Rosholm, M. (2008): “Experimental Evidence on the Nature of the Danish Employment 
Miracle”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3620. 
Rubin, D.B. (1974): “Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and 
Nonrandomized Studies”, Journal of Educational Psychology, 66 (5), 688-701.  
SECO, State Secretary for Economic Affairs (2017): “Die Lage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt im 
Februar 2017”, www.seco.admin.ch.  
Sianesi, B. (2004): “An Evaluation of the Swedish System of Active Labour Market 
Programmes in the 1990s”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 86 (1), 133-155.  
Signorovitch, J.E. (2007): “Identifying Informative Biological Markers in High-Dimensional 
Genomic Data and Clinical Trials”, PhD thesis, Harvard University. 
Su, X., C.L, Tsai, H. Wang, D.M. Nickerson, B. Li (2009): “Subgroup Analysis via Recursive 
Partitioning”, Journal of Machine Learning Research, 10, 141-158. 
Taddy, M., M. Gardner, L. Chen, D. Draper (2015): “A Nonparametric Bayesian Analysis of 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Digital Experimentation”, Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics, forthcoming.  
Tian, L., A.A. Alizadeh, A.J. Gentles, R. Tibshirani (2014): “A Simple Method for Estimating 
Interactions Between a Treatment and a Large Number of Covariates”, Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 109 (508), 1517-1532.  
Tibshirani, R. (1996): “Regression Shrinkage via the Lasso”, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series B, 58 (1), 267-288. 
45  
Van den Berg, G.J., B. van der Klaauw (2006): “Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed 
Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment”, International 
Economic Review, 47 (3), 895-936. 
Vansteelandt, S., T.J. VanderWeele, E.J. Tchetgen, J.M. Robins (2008): “Multiply Robust 
Inference for Statistical Interactions”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 103 
(484), 1693–1704. 
Varian, H. R. (2014): “Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28 (2), 3–28. 
Vikström, J., M. Rosholm, M. Svare (2013): “The Relative Efficiency of Active Labour Market 
Policies: Evidence from a Social Experiment and Non-Parametric Methods”, Labour 
Economics, 24, 58-67. 
Wager, S., S. Athey (2017): “Estimation and Inference of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
using Random Forests”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, forthcoming.  
Wunsch, C., M. Lechner (2008): “What Did All the Money Do? On the General Ineffectiveness 
of Recent West German Labour Market Programmes”, Kyklos, 61 (1), 134-174. 
Xu, Y., M. Yu, Y.-Q. Zhao, Q. Li, S. Wang, J. Shao (2015): “Regularized Outcome Weighted 
Subgroup Identification for Differential Treatment Effects,” Biometrics, 71 (3), 645–653. 
Zhang, B., A.A. Tsiatis, E.B. Laber, M. Davidian (2012): “A Robust Method for Estimating 
Optimal Treatment Regimes”, Biometrics, 68 (4), 1010–1018. 
Zhao, Y., D. Zeng, E.B. Laber, M.R. Kosorok (2015): “New Statistical Learning Methods for 
Estimating Optimal Dynamic Treatment Regimes”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 110 (510), 583-598. 
Zhao, Y., D. Zeng, A.J. Rush, M.R. Kosorok (2012): “Estimating Individualized Treatment 
Rules using Outcome Weighted Learning” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
107 (449), 1106–1118. 
Zou, H. (2006): “The Adaptive Lasso and its Oracle Properties”, Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 101 (476), 1418-1429. 
